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Abstract 
An extensive literature demonstrates that local campaign efforts in the UK generally pay 
electoral dividends for parties. As a result, rational parties focus campaign efforts most in 
seats where the electoral outcome is not pre-determined, and where a few more votes either 
way could change the result. An important indicator of where such constituencies can be 
found is provided by prior election results, and previous research has shown that rational 
parties tend to focus their campaigns most heavily on those seats where the previous election 
was close and less in seats where in the past they either lost badly or won comfortably. 
However, much less attention has been given to how local parties react to new information 
showing how the competitive situation in their area is changing as a general election 
approaches. The paper uses data from a rare set of local opinion polls conducted in around a 
quarter of British constituencies in the run-up to the 2015 UK General Election. Although 
hampered by their generally small size, limited fund-raising capacity and reliance on 
volunteers, local parties do respond to new information. Results indicate that parties tended to 
put more effort into local campaigns in seats where an opinion poll had been carried out than 
in otherwise similar seats where one had not. And the more competitive the poll suggested 
their race was, the more resources they devoted to it. 
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Election campaigns are often fast-moving and unpredictable. For instance, the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on the eve of the 2008 US Presidential election was a dramatic signal of 
worsening economic conditions: as the campaign went on, the economy loomed ever larger in 
votersÕ minds to the detriment of the Republican candidate (Scotto et al, 2008). A senior 
politician might get involved in a televised altercation with a voter, as in 2010, when UK 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown made unguarded comments about a Labour voter he met when 
out canvassing support (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010, 173ff). New opinion polls may suggest 
a dramatic shift in the public mood, as in the last days of the 2014 Scottish Independence 
Referendum. Parties, though they go into elections with carefully worked-out campaign 
strategies, cannot ignore such new developments. They must adapt and react. However, this 
requires some fleetness of foot on the part of participants as new challenges emerge and new 
opportunities arise.  
 
Analyses of election campaigns often devote much attention to how well (or badly) national 
party organisations do (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016; Heilemann and Halperin 2010; 
Halperin and Heilemann, 2013). But elections are not just fought through the Ôair warÕ of the 
national campaign. They also Ð and increasingly Ð take place through the Ôground warÕ of 
competition between candidates in local electoral districts and constituencies.  
 
These local competitions have measurable electoral impacts. For instance, the harder parties 
campaign locally, the better they do Ð especially when they are the local challenger rather 
than the incumbent (Jacobson, 1978, 2006; Johnston, 1987; Denver and Hands, 1997; Pattie 
et al., 1995; Fisher et al., 2011, 2014). We also know that face-to-face appeals often carry 
more weight than more impersonal forms of contact (Barton et al., 2013; Green et al., 2016).  
Yet Ð unlike national campaigns Ð we know remarkably little (anecdotal evidence aside) 
about how (or even if) parties adapt their grassroots election campaigns to take account of 
changing local circumstances.  
 
The UKÕs 2015 General Election provides a rare opportunity to analyse how local party 
organisations reacted to short-term political change in their areas when resourcing their 
campaigns. In the run-up to and during that election, political commentator Lord Ashcroft 
commissioned polls in a large number of constituencies throughout the country. Before 2015, 
constituency polls were rare in the UK (and often confined to by-elections rather than to 
General Elections) because of both the high costs of such an exercise and media 
concentration on the national race. Lord AshcroftÕs initiative therefore gives us an unusual 
level of insight into how opinion was shifting in a large group of constituencies immediately 
prior to the election, and hence provides an opportunity to see how local parties react when 
new information about their constituencies becomes available. The paper exploits this 
opportunity by comparing partiesÕ local spending patterns in seats where Lord Ashcroft 
polled and where he did not. For the first time, we are able to demonstrate consistent 
evidence that British parties do adapt their local campaigns in the light of new information. 
 
We begin by reviewing what we already know about partiesÕ campaign resource allocation 
decisions in UK parliamentary elections. We then discuss the Ashcroft polls and our 
analytical strategy, before presenting our key results. 
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Learning during campaigns 
 
Participants in election campaigns are bombarded with information regarding key campaign 
issues, the political context, and so on. Researchers have examined what voters learn during 
and from campaigns (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006; Hansen and Pedersen, 2014; Henderson, 
2014). Particularly relevant for what follows, recent work has shown that voters can be 
influenced by what they learn from opinion polls, in terms of both how they seek out 
information and how they might vote (Roy et al., 2015; van der Meer et al., 2016).  
 
Part of that learning process concerns the local political context within which voters live. 
Constituency turnout, for instance, is linked to marginality (Denver and Hand, 1985; 
Johnston and Pattie, 2006). The safer the seat, other things being equal, the lower the turnout 
there tends to be, as the chances of affecting the result by voting decline. What is more, some 
voters take the local tactical situation into account when deciding whom to vote for: faced 
with a risk that a party they strongly dislike might win in their constituency, some voters 
abandon their favourite party for one they see as second-best when the latter has a better 
chance of beating the party they detest than does their favourite (Tsebelis, 1986; Fieldhouse 
et al., 1996; Johnston and Pattie, 2011). 
 
But can local political parties and candidates learn about and respond to changing 
circumstances? They face several challenges in doing so. One relates to their capacities. 
Constituency campaigns are increasingly wrapped into partiesÕ national strategies (Norris, 
2000; Fisher and Denver, 2008). Even so, there is a clear asymmetry between constituency 
and national party organisations. The latter are generally highly professionalised and 
(relatively) well resourced. They have access to considerable information on changing 
patterns of support nationally, from both commercial and privately-commissioned opinion 
polls and focus groups. And when conditions change, they have professional staff and 
politicians on hand to analyse the emerging situation and plan appropriate responses.  
 
But constituency campaigns do not enjoy anything like the same levels of expertise or 
resourcing as their national counterparts. Rather, they are heavily reliant on local volunteers 
(few, if any of whom are political professionals) for much of their grassroots organisation and 
campaigning (Fisher et al, 2013, 2014). What is more, most work on very limited resources, 
which are largely locally raised and are subject to very tight spending limits during the last 
months of the campaign (Johnston and Pattie, 2014; Fisher, 2015). As a result, their 
capacities to spot local trends, and their room for manoeuvre when they do so, are inevitably 
more limited than is the case for their national counterparts.  
 
To a limited extent, national parties can help resource a few of their local organisationsÕ 
campaigns. The Conservatives, for instance, have at recent elections operated a Ôtarget seatÕ 
scheme (set up initially by Lord Ashcroft, whose constituency polls are used below, when he 
was Deputy Chair of the party: Johnston and Pattie, 2014). Under that scheme, local 
Conservative associations could apply for funding from the national party well in advance of 
an election in order to build their campaigns. Qualifying local parties were generally in 
marginal seats where the Conservatives were in second place, but which the party had to win 
in order to gain a parliamentary majority. But this of itself was not enough to elicit central 
support. The local party had to present Ð and deliver on Ð a detailed business plan for its 
intended use of the central resources. And, in an example of the campaign adaptation 
examined later in this paper, their performance was monitored. In the run-up to the 2010 
General Election, for instance, Conservative headquarters removed resources from some 
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previously supported local parties and moved them to others. In some cases, the local party 
was deemed to have done well enough to be sure of a win even without outside help whereas 
in others, resources were moved to local parties which previously had not benefitted, as 
changing electoral conditions suggested they were now viable Conservative targets. And the 
party also removed resources from local Conservative associations which were not delivering 
on their agreed plans. This strategy worked: Conservative candidates whose local 
organisation received money through the ÔAshcroft schemeÕ in 2009 to spend on pre-
campaign canvassing performed better at the 2010 general election that those who did not 
(Cutts et al., 2012). However, most local parties receive little or no financial help from the 
national party and must raise their own resources through their own local activities. 
 
Part of the challenge faced by local campaigners (and academics studying local campaigning) 
is finding out how the political situation might be changing in each constituency. Few local 
parties can afford regular Ð or even occasional Ð opinion polling within their constituencies. 
Further, given the rules on candidate expenses, they would struggle to conduct such polls 
even if they could afford them during the five months immediately prior to the election Ð 
when expenditure is limited to a maximum of around £40,000 (the actual amount is 
determined by constituency type Ð urban or rural Ð and size of the electorate).  
 
To be sure, some information on local political context is readily available to local party 
organisations and is used in deciding on campaign strategies. Past general election results 
give an indication of which seats are highly competitive and which are safely under the 
control of a particular party. Local parties increasingly allocate their (largely locally raised) 
campaign resources in line with these past results (Pattie and Johnston, 2003; Johnston and 
Pattie, 2006). Moreover, they raise (through donations and various fund-raising activities) 
and spend little in seats lost badly at the previous election (partly because campaign effort in 
such seats is unlikely to result in a win, but also because their local organisations in these 
places tend to be very resource-poor). But, increasingly, they also raise and spend relatively 
little (of the maximum allowed) on the campaigns in seats they won comfortably at the 
previous election. Generally speaking, limited resources are not such an issue in these seats, 
as they tend to have relatively healthy local organisations. But as these ÔsafeÕ seats will 
almost certainly be won again by the party no matter what, there is little advantage or 
incentive to build ever-larger majorities. It is in the most marginal constituencies, those 
where a few votes either way can affect the outcome, that local parties raise most money and 
campaign hardest; for parties of government, those activities tend to be most intense in seats 
won at the previous election to prevent any losses; for opposition parties, campaigning tends 
to be greatest in seats lost by relatively narrow margins at the previous contest in the hope of 
gaining more seats than previously and perhaps of unseating the government.  
 
But such information is not always terribly up to date and much can happen between 
elections. What is more, electorates in British constituencies are always changing: some 
voters die between elections, while first-time voters enter the electorate; people move into 
and out of the constituency; and people also change their minds over time. The results of the 
previous general election in a seat are a good first approximation of the state of political 
opinion there (the correlation between a partyÕs constituency vote at one election and its share 
at the next is generally very strong). But first approximations can be misleading (as illustrated 
by the 2015 results in Scotland: LabourÕs vote share there went from 42% in 2010 to 24%, 
and the party lost 40 seats, including many ostensibly safe ones, to the SNP). What is more, 
the results of the previous election give little or no information on how individual voters, or 
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different areas within the constituency, might vote, and hence cannot help parties finesse their 
local campaigns in terms of targeting particular neighbourhoods of groups of voters.  
 
Local parties have other means to assess public opinion. Council elections provide regular 
information on levels of party support at the sub-constituency scale of local government 
wards. Depending on the local government electoral cycle in an area, the information in these 
databases (assuming they are carefully maintained) can also be quite up to date when an 
election is called, though in some areas, especially where local authorities are elected in Ôall 
outÕÕ elections once every four years rather than by thirds in three years out of every four, the 
data can be quite old.
1
 But there are complications. Local issues matter in such contests even 
if some voters use them to express their opinion (usually negative) on the national 
governmentÕs performance.  And turnout tends to be lower than in national elections. Parties 
which rely on local election results to guide their planning for national contests might be 
misled if they are not careful (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997). 
 
Local parties also put much effort into their own canvassing efforts. Party members and 
volunteers contact voters within the constituency (often by knocking on their doors) and try 
to ascertain which party they support. This allows parties to identify their firm supporters, 
voters who might lean towards them but are not yet fully committed, voters whose support is 
wavering, voters who support other parties, and so on (this information can be augmented by 
data obtained from national canvassing Ð usually by telephone Ð by the partyÕs headquarters 
polling operations, targeted on marginal seats). From this information they can gain some 
sense of local opinion and can begin to target campaign efforts. For most local parties, these 
canvass returns are a valuable resource. However, the data they provide is imperfect. 
Canvassing rarely achieves 100% coverage of a constituency electorate. Nor is it systematic 
or scientific. Much of the information is gathered by volunteers, who do not always follow 
strict protocols, and may mis-record information, or misinterpret what they are told (on which 
see Barwell, 2016). Voters on the doorstep, meanwhile, may not always give an accurate 
account of their political leanings to canvassers. And canvassing is very labour-intensive: 
parties find it hard to update their canvassing databases frequently. What is more, there are 
significant variations from constituency to constituency, even within the same party, in how 
well (or badly) local activists are able to carry out canvassing. Both the quantity and quality 
of the information produced can be highly variable.  
 
Compared to their national party organisations, therefore, local parties face substantial 
uncertainty regarding changing local opinion, especially as an election nears. Even so, there 
is some evidence, from individual constituency campaigns, that local parties do try to react to 
what is happening in their area in the run-up to and during an election, and do adapt their 
campaigning accordingly (Cutts, 2006; Smith, 2011; Barwell, 2016). But these are isolated 
case studies of individual constituency campaigns by particular parties. While they offer 
insights into the detail of local campaigning, it is hard to know whether the degree of 
flexibility in local campaign activity they reveal can be generalised to other seats. To find 
out, we need more systematic evidence across many seats and parties.  
 
                                                
1
 The precise arrangements for local government elections in the UK vary from local authority to local authority. 
One major area of variation is over the frequency of elections. Some local authorities hold Ôat largeÕ elections 
once every four years, at which all councillors are simultaneously up for elections. Other local authorities 
operate elections Ôby thirdsÕ: here elections are held in three out of every four years, and at each annual election, 
a third of the councillors stand for re-election.  
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But here we face a problem. How can we know Ð across a range of constituencies Ð just what 
sorts of changing local conditions the various campaigns face? We could, like the parties, fall 
back on past election results. But the same issues would confront us in using such 
information that confronts the parties themselves. Past general election results cannot reflect 
local changes since those elections. And local council election results are both variable in 
how recent they might be and conflate judgments on both local and national governments.  
 
Nor can we fall back on evidence from partiesÕ own local opinion polling (where such polls 
are conducted) and canvassing records. These data are politically sensitive, confidential and 
often unavailable to either the public or to academic researchers. We need some other means 
of assessing the local climate of opinion in a range of constituencies as an election 
approaches. In the remainder of this paper, we therefore turn to data from a rare series of 
constituency opinion polls which were conducted and released publicly in the months before 
the UKÕs 2015 General Election (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015, 234). 
 
Lord AshcroftÕs constituency polls 
 
The constituency polls were commissioned by Lord Michael Ashcroft, a multi-millionaire 
businessman and former Deputy Chair and Treasurer of the Conservative party who since 
2010 has become a prominent pollster and political commentator (Ashcroft 2005, 2010, 
2015).  They were conducted in constituencies throughout Britain: details of each were 
released publicly via his website, and they were often reported by both the national and local 
press.
2
 By the time of the 2015 election, he had commissioned and published details of polls 
in 167 seats, just over a quarter of all British constituencies (none were conducted in 
Northern IrelandÕs 18 constituencies). Of those constituencies, 103 were polled just once, 46 
were polled twice, 16 three times, and 2 on four separate occasions (See Appendix 1 for a list 
of all the constituencies polled and how often). The first of his constituency polls were 
carried out in May 2014, a year before the election. The final ones took place in April 2015, 
virtually on the eve of the election itself. In 44% of the constituencies polled, the most recent 
Ashcroft poll before the 2015 election had already taken place by the end of November 2014. 
In the remainder, the last Ashcroft polls took place at some point between December 2014 
and the end of April 2015. In 30% of the ÔAshcroft pollÕ constituencies, the final pre-election 
poll took place in April 2015. 
 
The seats where ÔAshcroft pollsÕ were carried out were not a random cross-section of 
constituencies. Not surprisingly, they were chosen with an eye to potentially dramatic stories. 
They were significantly more marginal, on average, than were seats where Ashcroft polls 
were not conducted. The average margin of victory for the winning party in 2010 was 10.3% 
in seats where polls were conducted, but it was 21.3% in the 465 seats where no poll was 
carried out (t = 11.04, p < 0.001). But not all seats polled were marginals (and not all 
marginals were polled). While 78% of those seats with a 2010 majority of 5% points or 
smaller were polled, 22% were not. The percentage polled dropped steeply thereafter, to 39% 
of those seats held with majorities of between 5% and 10%, 26% of those where the majority 
was in the range 10-15%, down to just 4% of those where the majority was in the range 25-
30%. But 13% of those with majorities of over 30% points were polled (almost all of which, 
for reasons discussed below, were in Scotland). 
 
                                                
2
 http://lordashcroftpolls.com 
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Some of the polled constituencies would likely have been chosen because they were 
particularly newsworthy. For instance, Thanet South, polled four times by Ashcroft, was the 
seat contested by Ukip leader Nigel Farage. The possibility of a successful Ukip insurgency 
was one of the stories of the campaign, and this was one of their highest-profile battles (Ford 
and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). Sheffield Hallam, meanwhile, was polled 
on three occasions. This was the seat defended by Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal 
Democrats and Deputy Prime Minister in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government between 2010 and 2015. His party had suffered badly in the polls as a result of 
joining the coalition, and much of the opprobrium this attracted was focussed on Mr Clegg. 
Although his seat was ostensibly safe (in 2010 he enjoyed a 15,284 vote majority Ð around 30 
percentage points Ð over the Conservative candidate, with Labour in third place), he faced a 
strong challenge from Labour in 2015: his majority was cut to just 2,353 votes, or a 4 
percentage point margin, with Labour in second place. And, anticipating the possibility of an 
SNP surge (Johns and Mitchell, 2016), Scottish constituencies were over-represented among 
those polled: whereas 9% of all constituencies are in that country, 17% of those polled by 
Lord Ashcroft were Ð and, as noted above, most of these were ostensibly very safe Labour 
seats indeed (though in the event, they were not: all bar one of LabourÕs erstwhile Scottish 
strongholds were won by the SNP in 2015). 
 
Measuring the effect of local polls on campaign activity 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on whether there is an association between the extra 
information on the electoral contest locally provided by an Ashcroft constituency poll and the 
resource a local party devotes to its campaign. The Conservative MP for ultra-marginal 
Croydon South, has described how his 2015 re-election campaign strategy was affected by 
the publication of three ÔAshcroft pollsÕ for his constituency (Barwell, 2016). The first two 
polls (conducted in October 2014 and March 2015) both suggested he was losing to the 
Labour candidate. As a result, his campaign micro-targeted particular groups of voters who 
they felt could be persuaded to swing to the Conservatives Ð activities that called for more 
funds, with an additional £90,000 being raised. For each targeted group, particular campaign 
messages were developed and were disseminated through bespoke leaflets and election 
material. Some relief came in the final Ashcroft poll in his seat, conducted during April 2015, 
which suggested he had pulled ahead of his rival by a reasonable margin. Although he was 
anxious that the apparent turnaround in his constituency might make his voters complacent 
and therefore risked reducing his vote if some stayed at home assuming the result was already 
settled (Barwell, 2016, 213ff), the poll was a harbinger of what was to come in the actual 
election: Mr Barwell was successfully re-elected (though by a notably narrower margin than 
the final Ashcroft poll suggested).
3
 
 
But was the Croydon Central MP unusual in reacting to an Ashcroft poll? Or did other local 
parties adjust their strategies based upon the availability of local ÔAshcroft pollÕ data? We are 
unable to get into the fine detail of issues such as micro-targeting in most seats. But we can 
get some idea by looking at the resources candidates put into their election campaigns. Other 
things being equal, we anticipate that local parties will up their campaign game (i.e., devote 
more resources to it) in seats where an Ashcroft poll has been conducted than they will in 
                                                
3
 Eventually, just before the short campaign began in in April, the Conservative party headquarters added 
Croydon Central to its list of targeted marginal seats; no additional money was provided but the constituency 
was added to those whose electors were canvassed from the national/regional call centres, activists from outside 
the constituency were encouraged to move there and campaign, and ministerial visits to support the candidate 
were scheduled. 
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seats where one has not been carried out (and the extra information it might supply is 
therefore not available). What is more, we hypothesise that, in these seats where Ashcroft 
polls were conducted and reported before the start of the short campaign, the closer the 
contest between the lead parties implied by these polls, the more resources they will put into 
their campaigns. 
 
To do this, we need a consistent measure of campaign activity. As in previous research, we 
employ candidatesÕ reported expenditures on their campaigns. These data are publicly 
available and cover (almost) every constituency campaign in the country, as all candidates in 
British elections are legally required to make a declaration of their campaign spending for 
two designated periods: the four months before the election is formally called (the so-called 
Ôlong campaignÕ), and the normally four week period between the official launch of the 
election campaign (which begins when Parliament is prorogued) and polling day itself. 
Although not a perfect measure of campaign activity, campaign spending does correlate very 
strongly with other independent measures of campaign intensity (Pattie et al., 1994; Denver 
and Hands, 1997, 246ff; Johnston and Pattie, 2006, 199ff). It has the further advantage over 
other measures of being ubiquitous. 
 
In the following analyses, our dependent variables are the amounts each party spent per 
constituency on the 2015 campaign as a percentage of the legally permitted maximum in each 
seat.
4
 One oddity of the 2015 candidate spending data which is worth bearing in mind, 
however, is that there is an unusually large number of constituencies in which the data 
indicates no (£0) expenditure (table 1). For the Conservatives, for instance, 23% of 
constituency parties were recorded on the Electoral CommissionÕs database as spending £0 in 
their 2015 long campaigns, and 12% were recorded as spending £0 on their short campaigns. 
Similar proportions of Labour candidates, and rather higher proportions of Liberal Democrat 
candidates, were also recorded as spending nothing on their campaigns.  This compares very 
unfavourably with the equivalent data for the 2010 campaign, when far fewer candidates 
from the major parties were recorded as spending nothing, especially during the short 
campaign.  
 
It is undoubtedly the case that all the major parties will field some Ôpaper candidatesÕ in seats 
where they know they will lose badly. Such candidates do little or no real campaigning 
(spending virtually nothing) and simply represent their party locally, allowing it to claim it is 
present everywhere in the country. And Ð because funds are raised locally Ð many candidates, 
even where they do fight an active campaign, cannot afford to mount strong campaigns in 
both the long and the short campaign periods: such candidates will often opt to hold back 
during the long campaign in order to maximise their efforts during the intense period of the 
short campaign. This largely accounts for the rather higher levels of zero expenditure during 
the long than the short campaign in both 2010 and 2015.  
 
                                                
4
 CandidatesÕ spending on their constituency campaigns in UK General Elections is subject to tight legal limits, 
set by whether a seat is an urban (or ÔboroughÕ) or more rural (or ÔcountyÕ) constituency, and by how many 
registered electors live in the seat. At the 2015 General election, the Ôlong campaignÕ legal limit for a candidate 
was £30,700 plus 9p per elector in county seats and 6p per elector in a borough seat. During the Ôshort 
campaignÕ, the limit was set at £8,700 plus 9p (for county) or 6p (if borough) per elector. The data are available 
on the Electoral CommissionÕs website, at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-
subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/uk-general-elections/candidate-election-
spending.  
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But neither explanation really accounts for the much higher levels of non-returns in 2015 than 
in 2010, particularly given that many of the candidates recorded as spending nothing in 2015 
contest the same seats, many of which are clustered in the same local authorities. For 
instance, according to the Electoral CommissionÕs data, no candidate fighting in any 
Sheffield constituency in 2015 spent a penny campaigning. This is clearly implausible. Since 
so many of these Ôzero returnsÕ cluster in this way, we suspect that we are picking up a 
breakdown of communication between local returning officers (local government employees 
who are responsible for the conduct of elections in their areas, and to whom candidates are 
legally required to report their campaign spending) and the Electoral Commission, to which 
body returning officers are expected (but not obliged) to send on the data.
5
 We cannot be 
sure, therefore, whether £0 spending returns in the Electoral CommissionÕs 2015 candidate 
spending files really reflect a non-existent local campaign, or just missing data. We therefore 
err on the side of caution and in the analyses reported below focus only on those campaigns 
where some spending is recorded. For the same reason, we focus on spending during the 
short, and not the long campaign (as we have more cases to work with in the former case). 
We are confident, however, that excluding the Ôzero spendingÕ constituencies from the 
analysis does not bias our results, since the seats for which we have no spending data are by 
and large very similar in most salient respects to those for which we do have data.
6
 
 
In the following regression analyses, we look in more detail at constituency campaign 
spending by the three British parties with the best-developed constituency organisations 
across the country: the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats.
7
 We exclude the 
Northern Irish constituencies, where a very different party system pertains and no polls were 
conducted. 
 
Baseline models 
 
We begin by building baseline models to take into account some of the longer-term 
influences on levels of constituency campaigning, as well as provide a benchmark against 
which to assess the effects of the Ashcroft polls. Four explanatory variables are included in 
these baseline models. All four factors reflect conditions in each constituency at the previous 
General Election in 2010, on the grounds that past behaviour is likely to be a good guide to 
future behaviour, both for us and for local parties deciding on their campaign strategies, and 
the 2010 election gives a recent time point for which common data are available for all seats. 
The results of these baseline models are given in table 2. All three models provide reasonable 
fits, with R
2
 values ranging from 0.57 (for Conservative short campaign spending in 2015) to 
0.70 (for the Liberal Democrats).  
                                                
5
 There is anecdotal evidence that this may be a consequence of increasing pressure on local authority budgets 
as a result of government-enforced austerity measures after 2010. Local authoritiesÕ election services are 
vulnerable to spending cuts, especially where these can be applied without compromising statutory duties Ð and 
returning candidate accounts to the Electoral Commission fits the bill in this regard for making savings. 
6
 Chi-square tests confirm no relationship between 2010 winner and presence or absence of 2015 short 
campaign spending data in the Ashcroft seats: for the Conservatives, the chi-square value is 4.323, p-0.229; for 
Labour, it is 4.406, p=0.221; and for the Liberal Democrats, it is 5.790, p=0.122. T-tests also confirm that, for 
Labour and the Conservatives, 2010 percentage majorities in seats where ÔshortÕ spending data were available 
were statistically indistinguishable from the equivalent majorities in seats where no ÔshortÕ spending data were  
available (for the Conservatives, t = 1.003, p = 0.317; for Labour, t = 1.351, p 0.178). For the Liberal 
Democrats, meanwhile, there is almost (but not quite) a statistically significant difference in 2010 majority 
between seats where there was no 2015 ÔshortÕ campaign return for the Liberal Democrat candidate than in seats 
where there was a Liberal Democrat return (the average 2010 majority in the former seats was 15.0%, while in 
the latter it was 9.4%: t = 1.881, p = 0.069). 
7
 All models were fitted using R (R Development Core Team, 2013). 
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The first explanatory variable is a time-lagged version of the dependent variable: how much 
the party spent (as a percentage of the legally permitted maximum) in each constituency at 
the previous 2010 General Election. This captures any tendency towards long term stability in 
local campaign spending decisions. As most local spending is based on local fund raising, 
richer and more successful parties are liable always to allocate more resources to their local 
campaigns than are poorer and less successful parties.  
 
Consistent with that expectation of underlying stability, in all three models, the coefficient for 
2010 campaign spending is both positive and significant. The more a party spent on its 
constituency ÔshortÕ campaign in 2010, the more it spent in 2015. What is more, past 
spending decisions play an important role. Analyses with 2010 spending as the sole 
explanatory variable (not reported here but available on request from the authors) show that, 
alone, it accounts for 40% to 50% of the variation between constituencies in 2015 campaign 
spending. 
 
Before moving on, it is worth also noting that controlling for campaign spending levels in 
2010 has a helpful side-effect for our subsequent discussions. It means the model coefficients 
for other explanatory variables now tell us how much, on average, they contributed to 
changing partiesÕ campaign resource allocation decisions. 
 
The second explanatory factor in our baseline models is a dummy variable recording whether 
a party was fighting in a seat it already held (having won it in 2010: these seats were coded 
1), or in a seat where it was the challenger (coded 0). We expect parties in government 
nationally (in 2015, the coalition: the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) to expend more 
effort on those seats they already hold (in order to minimise losses to opposition parties) and 
less in seats where they are in second place or worse (as few incumbent governments expect 
to increase their haul of seats). Rational opposition parties, meanwhile, need to increase their 
number of MPs if they are to stand any chance of entering government. So we might expect 
them Ð in this case Labour Ð to spend more on their campaigns in seats where they are not 
currently the incumbent than in seats they already hold. 
 
As expected, and other things being equal, Conservative and Liberal Democrat constituency 
parties spent significantly more during the 2015 short campaign, on average, in those seats 
they were defending in 2015 than where they were challenging. Conservative short campaign 
spending in 2015 was 13 percentage points higher on average where they were defending a 
seat than where they were challenging. In seats defended by the Liberal Democrats, spending 
was an average of 51 percentage points higher than was the case where they were 
challengers.  
 
Almost certainly, this reflects the partiesÕ rather different underlying positions. The 
Conservatives, both nationally and at the grassroots level, have considerably greater 
resources on which to draw than do the Liberal Democrats. Conservative challengers often 
had reasonable levels of resourcing to draw on, narrowing the spending gap between them 
and Conservatives defending seats for the party. Liberal Democrat challengers had far fewer 
resources, hence the larger spending gap between them and Liberal Democrat candidates 
defending the partyÕs 2010 seats. What is more, the ÔcostsÕ of being involved in the coalition 
fell asymmetrically on the two partners: while polls showed that within the coalition 
Conservative support had largely held up, Liberal Democrat support had collapsed, and the 
latter party feared it might lose many of its MPs in 2015 (as proved to be the case). It 
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therefore abandoned any hopes of increasing its number of MPs and moved into damage 
limitation, trying to protect its existing seats as much as it could. So the Liberal Democrats, 
with less cash than their coalition partners and facing greater threats to their smaller number 
of sitting MPs, seem to have really concentrated on raising what limited resources they could 
in 2015 on trying to hold on where they could, while their richer and less threatened coalition 
partners could (and had the ability to) raise campaign resources on a much wider scale, 
including to some challenger candidates in races where the Conservatives might make gains. 
 
As the main opposition party going into the 2015 election, LabourÕs primary goal was to elect 
more MPs. Other things being equal, it concentrated more on raising and spending campaign 
resources where it was the challenger rather than in seats which it was defending. Its 2015 
short campaign spend was on average 19 percentage points lower on the latter group of seats 
than in the former. 
 
Our third ÔbaselineÕ explanatory variable is how marginal constituencies were for each party 
going into the 2015 election. We measure this taking the absolute value of the difference 
between each partyÕs 2010 vote share in a constituency and (where the party won the seat in 
2010) the party in second place, or (where the party lost) the winning party. The smaller the 
marginality score, therefore, the more competitive the seat was for a party. Our expectation, 
that parties spend most in seats where their margin of victory at the preceding election was 
close than in seats where their position was less competitive (either because they were 
already well ahead of their nearest rival or because they were far behind the winning party), 
is confirmed for all three parties. The more competitive the race (and hence the smaller the 
marginality score), the more the party spent. 
 
Our final ÔbaselineÕ indicator is the interaction between how marginal a seat was for a party 
in 2010 and whether the party won the seat in 2010. This captures the possibility that the 
relationship between past marginality and current (2015) campaign resource allocations 
might be different in seats where a party is challenging than in seats which it is defending. 
The interaction terms were not significant in either the Conservative or the Liberal Democrat 
campaign spending models, suggesting that the rate at which spending fell as seats became 
safer was much the same in those seats where the party was the incumbent as in seats where it 
was the challenger. But for the Labour party, the interaction term was significant and 
positive. In other words, while Labour spent more in marginals than in safe seats, the fall-off 
in spending with declining marginality was steeper in seats where the party was the 
challenger than where it was the incumbent. 
 
On the whole, these results echo the findings of previous research on British campaign 
spending (Pattie and Johnston, 2003; Johnston and Pattie, 2006) but it is worth noting that the 
2015 election confirms that the Conservatives have modernised their constituency campaign 
operation. Up until the mid-2000s, local Conservative Associations were technically 
independent of the national. This meant that the wealthiest and safest Conservative 
constituencies tended to raise and spend most on their local campaigns, and their members 
were reluctant to be sent to canvass support elsewhere in more marginal seats. But party 
reforms in the mid-2000s brought the local Associations into the wider party structure, 
making co-ordination easier, while the so-called ÔAshcroft moneyÕ scheme (discussed above) 
helped the party focus more on its marginal battles than on its safest seats. Dividends from 
this, in the form of a greater focus of resources in marginals, were already evident in 2010: in 
2015 we find evidence that this trend has continued. 
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The presence or absence of extra information: the effect of an Ashcroft poll 
 
Did the ÔAshcroft pollsÕ conducted over the year before the 2015 General Election affect 
campaign resource allocation decisions? Our first step is to compare 2015 short campaign 
spending in seats where at least one Ashcroft poll was conducted with spending in seats 
where no such poll occurred. We therefore add a dummy variable, measuring whether or not 
at least one Ashcroft poll had occurred in a constituency, to the baseline models (table 3).  
 
Since the baseline models already control for the tactical situation in the seat in 2010, we take 
into account the tendency for Ashcroft polls to be focussed on more ÔinterestingÕ and 
marginal seats than in more predictable and safer ones. This matters, as we might otherwise 
mistake partiesÕ tendency to focus resources on marginal races for an ÔAshcroft pollÕ effect. 
In our model, any evidence of party campaign spending being influenced by the presence of a 
poll is net of this general tendency to focus on marginals. What is more (as noted above), 
because our baseline models contain a lagged dependent variable, in the form of the 2010 
short campaign expenditure in each seat, the coefficients for the ÔAshcroft pollÕ dummies 
indicate how much short campaign spending is changed by the presence of a constituency 
poll. This is equivalent to comparing two seats which in 2010 had the same marginalities, 
campaign spending levels and incumbency (and where we might expect, other things being 
equal, a party to spend similar amounts on its 2015 campaign). If an Ashcroft poll had been 
conducted in one of these seats but not in the other, the coefficient for the ÔAshcroft pollÕ 
dummy variable in each model would indicate how much more (or less) that party might 
spend in the presence of the poll. 
 
With that in mind, there is clear evidence that both Labour and the Conservatives expended 
more resources on their short campaigns in seats where a poll took place than in seats where 
there was no poll (table 3). For both parties, the ÔAshcroft pollÕ dummy variable was both 
statistically significant and positive, even when we control for past spending, marginality and 
incumbency. What is more, the effect sizes are large. Other things being equal, the 
Conservatives increased their 2015 short campaign spending by 19 percentage points on 
average in seats where they had information from an Ashcroft poll. Meanwhile, LabourÕs 
2015 short campaign expenditure was just under 10 percentage points higher, on average, 
where a poll had taken place than where it had not, ceteris paribus. 
 
The Liberal Democrats, however, did not react in the same way. Their ÔAshcroft pollÕ 
coefficient was small, negative, and not significant. Whether a poll took place in a seat made 
little or no difference to how much the party expended on its 2015 short campaign. In part 
this discrepancy between the Liberal Democrats and their two main rivals may be a function 
of the considerably more limited resources available to the former party compared to the 
latter two. The Liberal Democrats may have been at full stretch to meet their existing 
campaign commitments, and hence unable to move resources late in the day.  
 
In part, too, it may reflect the fact that in seats where polls were conducted (as in all seats) 
Labour and Conservative candidates were more likely to be in first or second place at the 
2010 election than were Liberal Democrat candidates. In 80% of the seats where an Ashcroft 
poll was conducted, a Conservative was first or second in 2010, and in 75% a Labour 
candidate had been in one of the top two positions then. A Liberal Democrat was first or 
second in 2010 in only 35% of the ÔAshcroft pollÕ constituencies. What is more, the polls 
themselves confirmed the Liberal DemocratsÕ parlous state on the eve of the 2015 election. In 
the last Ashcroft poll conducted in each constituency, the Liberal Democrats were predicted 
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as the winners in just 11% of the seats polled and were placed second in a further 14%. In 
three-quarters of the seats polled by Lord Ashcroft, therefore, his data put the Liberal 
Democrats in third place or worse. By contrast, the Conservatives and Labour were each in 
one or other of the top two positions in the final Ashcroft poll in 71% of the seats polled. 
While both Labour and the Conservatives stood to gain in a sizeable number of seats by 
campaigning more where an Ashcroft poll had been conducted, therefore, the polls merely 
confirmed what the Liberal Democrats already knew: they had to focus on damage limitation 
in the seats they already held. 
 
Does the poll margin matter? 
 
The final analyses examine whether parties responded to the tactical situation depicted by an 
Ashcroft poll. For instance, if a poll indicated that a party faced a tighter-than-expected race 
in a constituency, we might expect it to devote more campaign resources to that race. But 
parties might decide to expend fewer campaign resources than they had intended in seats 
where polls indicated they were pulling further ahead of their nearest rivals, or were falling 
further out of contention. 
 
These analyses focus only on constituencies where Ashcroft polls were conducted. We use 
the last poll carried out in each seat before the election, as this represents the most up-to-date 
polling information on local conditions (outside partiesÕ own canvassing data) available in the 
run-up to and during the short campaign. For each of our three parties, we include a dummy 
variable for whether it was in the lead in that last Ashcroft poll, a variable measuring the 
absolute percentage point difference in the poll between it and (where it was the poll leader) 
the second-placed party or (where it was not shown as in the lead) the party which did lead 
locally in the poll, and a term for the interaction between poll margin and being poll leader. 
The rationale for each of these terms is similar to that offered above for the 2010 variables 
utilised in the baseline models. Our primary expectation is that, other things being equal, the 
closer the Ashcroft poll suggests a race is for a party, the more resources that party will put 
into its local campaign.  
 
As the results in table 4 control for the 2010 tactical situation in each seat, we can rule out the 
possibility that the Ashcroft polls merely re-iterate the information available to all parties 
from the preceding general election. The coefficients for the ÔAshcroftÕ variables tell us how 
much spending changed in response to the local tactical situation indicated by the poll results. 
 
Conservative local candidates in the polled seats paid attention not just to how marginal the 
seat was for them in 2010 (the relevant coefficient remains significant and correctly signed) 
but also to the margin indicated by the Ashcroft poll. The closer the poll suggested their fight 
in the seat was (and hence the smaller the poll margin variable), the more they increased their 
short campaign expenditure. Every percentage point closer the final Ashcroft poll in their 
area suggested the race was becoming for them increased their short campaign expenditure 
by 0.78 percentage points over and above what we might have assumed it would be given the 
partyÕs efforts in the seat in 2010 and the results of that election there.  
 
Strikingly, however, although the Conservatives did spend more, on average, in seats they 
already held than in seats where they were challengers, they did not focus any extra efforts on 
defending those seats where the final Ashcroft poll put them ahead. Neither the dummy 
variable for being the Ashcroft poll winner in their seat, nor the interaction between it and the 
Ashcroft margin were significant. The implication is clear: local Conservative parties seem to 
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have used the information from the Ashcroft polls  to stimulate more money-raising efforts 
on the most competitive races for them, irrespective of whether they were trying to re-elect a 
sitting MP or to win a seat from a rival party. 
 
For Labour, meanwhile, the situation in the seats that Lord Ashcroft polled was very 
different. As we have already seen, the party focussed its short campaign most heavily on 
those seats where it was the challenger after 2010, and where its 2010 margin was closer 
(table 2); other things being equal, it spent more than expected in seats where an Ashcroft 
poll had been conducted than in seats where none were (table 3). But how close the final poll 
suggested the race was becoming in a seat made no discernible difference to how much 
Labour raised and spent there. Over and above the decision to ÔinvestÕ more in seats where a 
poll had taken place, therefore, local Labour party decisions on where to raise and spend 
more were still guided mainly by how marginal the seat had been for the party in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2010 election (the 2010 margin coefficient remains significant 
and correctly signed in the Labour equation). 
 
While we cannot directly prove a link, the contrast between, on the one hand, a Conservative 
campaign which responded not just to the presence of an Ashcroft poll but also to the story 
the poll told and, on the other, a Labour campaign which did the former but not the latter is 
consistent with other analyses of the 2015 election. Labour went into the 2015 election 
committed to an ambitious programme of doorstep canvassing while accepting that they had 
much less money available than their main rivals (Watson, 2015).
8
 But anecdotal evidence 
from the campaigns themselves suggest that LabourÕs efforts were rather monolithic and 
unimaginative compared to those of their Conservative rivals, who put more effort on micro-
targeting messages to particular groups of key voters than did Labour (Cowley and 
Kavanagh, 2015, chapter 10).
9
 Our results, too, suggest the Conservatives were fleeter of foot 
in adapting their 2015 local campaign to changing circumstances than were Labour.  
 
The Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, though they did not increase local campaign spending in 
a seat just because an Ashcroft poll had been conducted there, do seem to have been 
responsive, in those seats where a poll did take place, to the messages it carried. In the 
Ashcroft poll constituencies for which we have data on the Liberal Democrats 2015 short 
campaign expenditure, the party spent more, other things being equal, the more competitive 
the seat seemed to be for them (as indicated by the significant, negative, coefficient for 
Ashcroft poll margin in the Liberal Democrat model).  
 
What is more, they seem to have focussed very much on those seats they had won in 2010 but 
were at greatest risk of losing. In fact, they spent considerably (almost 36 percentage points) 
more in those ÔAshcroftÕ seats which they held after 2010 than in those where they did not. 
However, holding 2010 incumbency constant, the party spent appreciably less in seats where 
the final Ashcroft poll suggested they were in the lead than in seats where it suggested they 
were not. And the interaction between a Liberal Democrat leading in the Ashcroft poll and 
the partyÕs margin in that poll was also significant and positive. What is more, the coefficient 
for the interaction term is not only of a different sign from that for the Ashcroft margin, but it 
                                                
8
 As intimated by party leader Ed Miliband in a speech to his party in January 2015, in which he committed the 
party to holding four million doorstep conversations with voters before the election: 
http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2015/01/05/ed-miliband-election-campaign-launch-speech-in-full. 
See also Watson (2015). 
9
 Barwell (2016, 230) claimed that many of the large number of outsiders brought in by Labour to canvass in 
Croydon Central Ôlooked like they didnÕt know where they were and seemed to wander around fairly aimlesslyÕ. 
  
14 
is also larger. This suggests that the party behaved differently in those Ashcroft seats where 
the final poll suggested it was not in the lead than in those where the poll did suggest it was 
winning.  
 
We can illustrate this by looking at a hypothetical ÔAshcroftÕ seat which the Liberal 
Democrats won in 2010, where they spent 50% of their permitted limit during that yearÕs 
Ôshort campaignÕ, and where they enjoyed a 10 percentage point margin of victory over their 
nearest rival in the 2010 vote. What does the Liberal Democrat model in table 4 reveal about 
how that partyÕs spending in the 2015 short campaign might vary depending on whether the 
last Ashcroft poll put the party ahead or behind, and on the partyÕs margin in that poll?  
Figure 1 presents the predicted values from the model presented in table 4. Other things being 
equal, if the Ashcroft poll suggested the Liberal Democrats were now losing in the seat (the 
dotted line in figure 1), the party seems to have focussed its efforts more in those seats where 
the poll indicated it was not far behind than in those where the poll suggested it was falling 
further behind. But in seats where the Ashcroft poll suggested it was still ahead (the solid 
line), the local party put greater efforts into seats where the poll suggested it was further 
ahead than into seats where it seemed to be holding on (but only just). Given the party 
expected significant losses in 2015 as a result of its unpopular decision to join the Coalition 
government in 2010, it seems to have increasingly concentrated its efforts on those contests 
and MPs it felt it stood some chance of retaining Ð and no seat was deemed too safe not to 
bother fighting hard for. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Despite their relatively limited resources, both financial and in personnel, Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal Democrat constituency parties proved flexible in their capacity to respond 
to new information about local conditions. As in previous elections, they utilised past election 
results to focus their 2015 constituency campaign efforts on those seats of most value to them 
in terms of potentially altering their representation in Parliament. All three parties focused on 
more marginal races: the parties from the incumbent government especially concentrating on 
those marginals which they already held, and the main opposition party on those they needed 
to win to increase their haul of MPs. 
 
But, more than that, where new and more recent information was available in the form of 
publicly disseminated constituency polls, local parties responded. By and large, the presence 
of a constituency poll elicited even greater campaign efforts from parties, especially where 
the poll suggested the race was even closer for them than the previous election result might 
have suggested. Their restricted resources notwithstanding, local parties were able to respond 
to new information. 
 
That said, there are some clear differences between the parties in exactly how this played out. 
While both Labour and the Conservatives campaigned more than expected in seats where an 
Ashcroft poll had taken place than in seats where one was not conducted, the Liberal 
Democrats did not. In those sets where a poll was conducted, LabourÕs campaign resourcing 
decisions were not finessed by how close the poll suggested the local race was for them: they 
spent up by roughly similar amounts in all seats where a poll had been conducted, no matter 
how competitive the poll suggested the race was becoming for them. In contrast, Liberal 
Democrat and Conservative candidates in polled constituencies did react to the poll margin, 
boosting spending in races which seemed to be becoming more competitive for them relative 
to races which seemed to be less competitive than initially expected. As we speculate in the 
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paper, this is consistent both with the rather different tactical challenges and resource 
constraints facing each party. As the least well-resourced of the three and the most likely to 
lose heavily in the election, the Liberal Democrats probably had little choice but to focus 
their efforts on defending seats where the polls suggested they remained ahead, but by narrow 
margins. The Conservatives, the best able of the three to mobilise financial and other 
resources locally, seem to have enjoyed the relative luxury of being able to choose (abetted to 
some degree, no doubt, by their ability to direct some national funds to particularly salient 
races. LabourÕs behaviour, meanwhile, was consistent with its professed ÔvolumeÕ approach 
to local campaigning in 2015, catching as many voters as possible rather than micro-targeting 
where it could. 
 
One limitation of our analyses, however, is that the patterns we reveal are ecological in 
nature. We can show that local parties faced with extra information in the form of a poll put 
more effort into their constituency campaigns than local parties without this extra stimulus. 
But we cannot prove that it was the poll itself which generated the reaction. It is possible that 
the poll only made public trends that were already evident to the local party through its own 
information networks (including its canvassing efforts). If so, our general argument Ð that 
constituency parties do routinely react to changing circumstances Ð still holds, even if the 
exact means by which they find out remains opaque.  
 
But that said, there are grounds for thinking the Ashcroft polls themselves were consequential 
in local partiesÕ decision-making. First, as noted in the paper, we do have anecdotal evidence 
from at least one constituency campaign on how it responded to Ashcroft polls in its area 
(Barwell, 2016). What is more, as we note above, our analyses control for the longer-term 
tactical situation in each seat. Hence, when we compare seats where a poll did take place with 
those which were not polled, we are, in an important sense, comparing like with like. And we 
do pick up Ôpoll effectsÕ. It is possible, of course, that Lord Ashcroft was canny enough to 
pick only those constituencies for his polls where local opinion really was shifting compared 
to 2010. But (while some judgement must be involved) it would be a lucky Ð or quite 
remarkably skilful Ð pollster indeed who managed to do so time after time. It is very unlikely 
that there were not similar late shifts in local opinion in many of the seats which were not 
polled as we see in those which were. And yet the parties reacted in the polled seats in a 
different way to how they behaved in the un-polled. This does suggest, therefore, that Lord 
AshcroftÕs polls did have an influence on how these local battles were fought. Local parties 
do learn and adapt, therefore Ð and it seems they (like the rest of us) pay attention to the polls. 
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Table 1: Constituencies in which campaigns are recorded as making £0 spending returns 
 
  Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
  N % N % N % 
2015 
Long 
campaign 
145 22.9 159 25.2 338 53.6 
Short 
campaign 
77 12.2 82 13.0 149 23.6 
2010 
Long 
campaign 
71 11.2 115 18.2 203 32.1 
Short 
campaign 
9 1.4 15 2.4 36 5.7 
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Table 2: 2015 short campaign constituency spending: Baseline models (standard errors in 
brackets: significant results in bold) 
 
 Y = 2015 short campaign spend as % of limit (y ≠ 0) 
 Con Lab LD 
2010 short spending % 0.48 
(0.04) 
0.41 
(0.04) 
0.25 
(0.04) 
2010 winner 13.33 
(3.18) 
-18.90 
(3.07) 
51.02 
(4.45) 
2010 % margin -0.57 
(0.11) 
-1.16 
(0.09) 
-0.48 
(0.11) 
2010 winner*2010 margin 0.15 
(0.14) 
1.03 
(0.13) 
0.36 
(0.27) 
Constant 27.17 
(4.56) 
56.33 
(3.95) 
20.11 
(3.78) 
    
R
2
 0.57 0.64 0.70 
N 540 531 458 
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Table 3: 2015 short campaign constituency spending: the Ashcroft effect (standard errors in 
brackets: significant results in bold) 
 
 Y = 2015 short campaign spend as % of limit (y ≠ 0) 
 Con Lab LD 
2010 short spending % 0.43 
(0.04) 
0.40 
(0.04) 
0.25 
(0.04) 
2010 winner 4.63 
(3.08) 
-11.88 
(3.36) 
51.90 
(4.70) 
2010 % margin -0.58 
(0.10) 
-1.00 
(0.10) 
-0.49 
(0.11) 
2010 winner*2010 margin 0.67 
(0.14) 
0.85 
(0.13) 
0.34 
(0.27) 
2015 Ashcroft poll 19.36 
(2.04) 
9.79 
(2.09) 
-1.12 
(1.89) 
Constant 25.45 
(4.22) 
48.62 
(4.21) 
20.76 
(3.94) 
    
R
2
 0.63 0.66 0.70 
N 540 531 458 
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Table 4: 2015 short campaign constituency spending: poll margin effects in polled 
constituencies (standard errors in brackets: significant results in bold) 
 
 Y = 2015 short campaign spend as % of limit (y ≠ 0) 
 Con Lab LD 
2010 short spending % 0.44 
(0.10) 
0.20 
(0.10) 
0.19 
(0.09) 
2010 winner -7.46 
(5.29) 
-12.50 
(8.03) 
35.81 
(8.84) 
2010 % margin -0.50 
(0.23) 
-1.28 
(0.31) 
-0.23 
(0.28) 
2010 winner*2010 margin 0.73 
(0.25) 
1.28 
(0.37) 
1.08 
(0.70) 
2015 Ashcroft poll leader -2.06 
(6.40) 
5.20 
(7.64) 
-23.23 
(11.41) 
2015 Ashcroft poll margin -0.78 
(0.25) 
-0.49 
(0.34) 
-0.90 
(0.28) 
2015 Ashcroft lead*margin 0.14 
(0.65) 
0.38 
(0.56) 
1.66 
(0.77) 
Constant 60.47 
(10.93) 
74.57 
(10.80) 
44.63 
(10.67) 
    
R
2
 0.80 0.63 0.84 
N 91 90 82 
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Figure 1: Liberal Democrat predicted 2015 short campaign spending in ÔAshcroftÕ 
constituencies 
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Appendix 1: Constituencies in which an ÔAshcroft pollÕ was conducted 
 
 
Constituency Name Number of ÔAshcroft pollsÕ 
conducted in seat  
West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine 1 
Airdrie and Shotts 1 
Amber Valley 2 
Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock 1 
South Basildon and East Thurrock 1 
Battersea 1 
Bedford 1 
Bermondsey and Old Southwark 1 
Berwick-upon-Tweed 1 
Berwickshire, Roxborough and Selkirk 1 
Birmingham, Edgbaston 2 
Birmingham, Yardley 1 
Blackpool North and Cleveleys 2 
Bolton West 2 
Boston and Skegness 1 
Bradford East 1 
Brecon and Radnorshire 1 
Brent Central 1 
Brentford and Isleworth 1 
Brighton, Kemptown 1 
Brighton, Pavilion 2 
Bristol North West 1 
Bristol West 1 
Broxtowe 2 
Burnley 1 
Bury North 1 
Camborne and Redruth 2 
Cambridge 2 
North East Cambridgeshire 1 
Cannock Chase 2 
Cardiff Central 1 
Cardiff North 2 
Carlisle 1 
Carmarthen West and Pembrokeshire South 1 
Carshalton and Wallington 1 
Castle Point 2 
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Cheadle 2 
Cheltenham 1 
City of Chester 2 
Chippenham 2 
Cleethorpes 1 
Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill 1 
Colchester 1 
Colne Valley 2 
Corby 1 
North Cornwall 4 
Crewe and Nantwich 1 
Croydon Central 3 
Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East 1 
Derby North 1 
North Devon 2 
Dewsbury 1 
Doncaster North 1 
Mid Dorset and North Poole 2 
Dover 1 
Dudley North 2 
Dudley South 1 
Dumfries and Galloway 1 
Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale 3 
East Dunbartonshire 1 
West Dunbartonshire 1 
Dundee West 1 
Ealing Central and Acton 1 
Eastbourne 1 
Eastleigh 2 
Edinburgh North and Leith 1 
Edinburgh South 1 
Edinburgh South West 1 
Elmet and Rothwell 1 
Enfield North 1 
Erewash 1 
North East Fife 1 
Finchley and Golders Green 1 
Glasgow Central 1 
Glasgow East 1 
Glasgow North 1 
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Glasgow North East 1 
Glasgow North West 1 
Glasgow South 1 
Glasgow South West 2 
Gloucester 2 
Gordon 1 
Great Grimsby 3 
Great Yarmouth 3 
Halesowen and Rowley Regis 2 
Halifax 1 
Hampstead and Kilburn 2 
Harlow 1 
Harrogate and Knaresborough 1 
Harrow East 2 
Hastings and Rye 1 
Hazel Grove 1 
Hendon 2 
High Peak 2 
Hornsey and Wood Green 1 
Hove 2 
Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey 1 
Ipswich 1 
Keighley 1 
Kingston and Surbiton 1 
Kingswood 2 
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath 1 
Lancaster and Fleetwood 2 
Lewes 1 
Lincoln 1 
Loughborough 2 
Manchester, Withington 1 
Milton Keynes South 1 
Morecambe and Lunesdale 3 
Morley and Outwood 1 
Motherwell and Wishaw 1 
Newton Abbot 1 
Northampton North 1 
Norwich North 2 
Norwich South 1 
Nuneaton 2 
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Oxford West and Abingdon 2 
Paisley and Renfrewshire South 2 
Pendle 2 
Peterborough 1 
Plymouth, Moor View 1 
Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport 1 
Portsmouth South 1 
Pudsey 3 
Redcar 1 
East Renfrewshire 3 
Rochester and Strood 1 
Ross, Skye and Lochaber 2 
Rossendale and Darwen 1 
Rother Valley 1 
St Austell and Newquay 3 
St Ives 3 
Sheffield, Hallam 3 
Sherwood 2 
Solihull 2 
North East Somerset 1 
Somerton and Frome 2 
South Ribble 1 
Southampton, Itchen 3 
Southport 1 
Stevenage 1 
Stockton South 3 
Stourbridge 1 
Stroud 1 
Sutton and Cheam 2 
South Swindon 3 
Taunton Deane 1 
Telford 1 
South Thanet 4 
Thornbury and Yate 1 
Thurrock 3 
Torbay 2 
Truro and Falmouth 1 
Vale of Glamorgan 1 
Walsall North 1 
Warrington South 1 
  
28 
Warwick and Leamington 1 
North Warwickshire 2 
Watford 3 
Waveney 2 
Weaver Vale 1 
Wells 2 
Wirral South 1 
Wirral West 3 
Wolverhampton South West 2 
Worcester 2 
Wyre Forest 1 
 
 
